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In this paper we propose straightforward extensions of multi-union, 
monopolistic competition models appearing in the recent literature on the 
macroeconomic effects of monetary policy. We extend these models from 
the Stackelberg equilibrium to the Nash equilibrium under variations in 
labor market regime in order to evaluate propositions about non-neutrality 
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The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we use a simplified version of the 
monopolistic competition model laid out in Coricelli et al. (2000)
1 to 
evaluate macroeconomic outcomes associated with different labor market 
regimes, which are defined by the rigidity of wage contracts. The labor 
market is rigid when unions set contract wages in advance (commitment) 
and cannot alter their claims after the monetary authority acts. It is flexible 
where unions do not sign binding contracts and have the capacity to vary 
wages ex-post in reaction to realizations of monetary policy.  
Second, we evaluate results concerning non-neutrality of monetary policy 
obtained in recent literature. In particular, we use a multi-union, 
monopolistic competition framework to evaluate Acocella and Di 
Bartolomeo’s (2002) specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
monetary policy non-neutrality. Our objective is to help clarify the reasons 
for differences in macroeconomic outcomes associated with the different 
labor market regimes. 
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1 We use the Coricelli et al. (2000) framework because of its generality; with simple 
assumptions it nests a number of the other models.    2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces 
the baseline model. Section 3 solves the players’ problems. Section 4 
considers different regimes. We first consider the more common case of the 
Stackelberg equilibrium, and we then extend the model to the Nash case. 
Section 5 discusses the results we obtain in the context of the debate on 
monetary policy non-neutrality. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The economic setup 
We consider a simple economy where a central bank interacts with several 
labor unions and firms. The basic setup is taken from Coricelli et al. (2000) 
as amended with some additional assumptions that simplify the exposition.
2 
The central bank determines aggregate demand by setting the money supply. 
Product prices and wages are determined by the firms and unions, 
respectively, which act in an imperfectly competitive environment.
3 We 
assume  n unions of equal size, with  [1, ] n∈+ ∞ , and a continuum of 
monopolistic firms of mass one, each producing one good. Unions are 
indexed by i. All the firms associated with union  [] 1, in ∈  in wage 
bargaining are indexed by ij and without loss of generality are assumed to 









                                                 
2 The Appendix gives a full derivation of the economic setup, as well as a description of the 
assumptions made to simplify the exposition. 
3 Competitive markets can be viewed as a limiting case. They have been analyzed 
elsewhere: Cubitt (1995) and Cukierman and Lippi (1999) for example investigate 
unionized labor markets with competitive goods markets and Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987) treat the case of imperfect competition without trade unions.    3
Firm(s)  ij maximize a one period profit function under demand and 












where  ij P  and P  are the individual firm price and general price level, 
respectively. The latter is conveniently defined as the geometric average of 
the individual firms’ prices.  1 η >  is the elasticity of demand facing the 
individual firm with respect to its relative price. Firm-level demand is also 





Each firm owns a production technology using labor inputs only and 
exhibiting decreasing returns to scale: 
(2)  ij ij YL
α =    () 0,1 α ∈  
where  ij Y  and  ij L  are the output supply and the labor input of firm ij.  
Using equations (1) and (2), firm ij’s conditions for profit maximization 
under monopolistic competition can be written as log-linear equations for 
product  price and labor demand:  
(3)  () ( ) ( ) 1 ij i p pm p w p θα α −= − − + −    
(4)  ()
d










 and lower case variables denote logs of the 
corresponding upper case variables.    4
Equation (3) can be rewritten in terms of unemployment among union i’s 
members as: 
(5)  () () ii uw p m p θη =− − −     
By averaging equations (3) and (4), one obtains (as shown in the Appendix) 
aggregate reduced forms for the price level and unemployment as: 
(6)  () 1 p wm αα =+ −  
(7)  uwm =− 
By using equation (6) we can rewrite equation (5) as:  
(8)  () 1 ii uw w m θη αη =− − −    
Equation (8) says that unemployment for union i’s members is positively 
related to union i’s wage claims but negatively related to the average wage. 
The effect of union i’s claim always dominates the average effect since 
() 1 ηα η >− . Unemployment is also decreasing in the nominal money 
supply. Taking account of the fact that the average nominal wage is equal to 
() 1 ii ww w σσ − =+ − , where 
1
n
σ =  is union i’s membership,
4 and  i w−  is the 
average nominal wage set by the other unions, equation (8) becomes:  
(9)  () () () { } 111 ii i uw w m θηα σ η α ση − =− −− −− −    
Equation (9) is union i’s reduced form unemployment rate. In setting the 
nominal wage union i faces two opposite effects. First, by raising its 
nominal wage, it decreases the demand for labor and, thus, employment 
because of the higher labor costs imposed on the firm. Second, by raising its 
                                                 
4 Recall that we have n unions of equal size.   5
wage, the union increases the average wage which by itself makes firm ij 
more competitive. The former effect of course always dominates the latter. 
 
3. Optimal policies 
3.1 The central bank’s problem 
We assume that the central bank seeks to minimize the following quadratic 








π =+ . 
1 p p π − =−  is the inflation rate.  () 0, β ∈+ ∞  is the central bank’s inflation 
aversion parameter. For a one period optimal policy the lagged price level, 
1 p− , is given parametrically. So without loss of generality it can be set to 
zero, which allows us to speak of current prices and inflation rates 
interchangeably, as in Cubitt (1995). 
By solving the central bank’s problem we obtain the optimal wage-
contingent monetary policy rule: 

















 ∈−  − 









,  0 φ <  and wage increases are accommodated; the 
central bank is liberal or “populist”.









                                                 
5 See, e.g., Guzzo and Velasco (1999).   6
0 φ >  and the central bank is conservative. The accommodation parameter 
φ  therefore defines the central bank’s effective degree of conservativeness.
7  
3.2 The labor unions’ problem                         
Recall that the number of unions is equal to  [1, ) n∈+ ∞ . Each union seeks to 
minimize its preference function defined by the membership’s real wage 







Uw p γ =− −    { } 1,2,... in ∈  
Parameter γ  is the union’s weight associated with the real wage rate. It can 
be interpreted as an index of the labor market distortion induced by the 
unions’ existence. 
The first order condition for union i is:  
(13)  () 10
i iu Zu Z π γ −− =  








 for  { } , i x u π ∈  depend on the regime facing a 
union because a union’s information set varies by regime as will be clear 
from the next section.
8 
                                                 
7 When φ equals the lower bound of its domain, we observe the ultra-liberal central bank, 
i.e. a central bank that takes account of unemployment only. With φ equal to the upper 
bound of its domain, we observe the ultra-conservative central bank, i.e. a central bank that 
takes account of inflation only. 
8 In other words, in the flexible wage regime (Nash equilibrium) the Zs are computed by 
differentiating equations (6) and (8) with respect to wi. By contrast in the rigid labor market 
regime (Stackelberg equilibrium), they are equal to the derivatives of (6) and (8) subject to 
equation (11). In differentiation, recall that w=σ wi+(1−σ) w-i.   7
4. Labor market regimes 
4.1 Regimes and information setting 
Equilibrium outcomes of the game are obtained by solving equations (11) 
and (13) under the unions’ information constraint. Different equilibrium 
concepts are associated with different information settings and associated 
specifications of expectations,
9 and therefore, they vary by labor market 
regime.  
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent’s discussion of equilibrium concepts and 
expectations, the Stackelberg equilibrium implies that unions must form 
rational expectations ex-ante about the central bank’s policy, and cannot 
change nominal wages thereafter. Therefore, this regime is associated with 
sticky wages set one period in advance. By contrast, in a Nash equilibrium 
environment each player forms (rational) expectations of the other’s best 
response policy. A Nash game therefore implies flexible wages — both 
players can always change the value of their control variables. Notice, 
however, that a Nash induced flexible wage setting does not mean that the 
labor market is perfectly competitive because of the unions’ monopolistic 
power in setting the nominal wages.  
Elasticities associated with the two equilibrium concepts are summarized in 
Table 1.  
                                                 
9 An excellent discussion on the relationship among equilibrium concepts, information sets, 
and rational expectations is provided by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000: Chapter 16).   8
Table 1.   Elasticities 
  Stackelberg information set  Nash information set 
Zπ   () α φ αφ σ −+   ασ  




















Elasticities under the rigid wage setting regime (Stackelberg equilibrium) 
are computed by differentiating equations (6) and (9) with respect to  i w  
after substituting m from (11) into the union’s FOC in (13). Elasticities 
associated with the flexible wage setting (Nash equilibrium) are obtained by 
differentiating equations (6) and (9) with respect to  i w , taking m as given.  
All the elasticities are positive and () 1
i wp ZZ π − −= . By using the elasticities 
in Table 1 in equations (11) and (13) we obtain the outcomes of the two 
labor market regimes in the next subsections. 
4.2 Rigid labor markets 
The Stackelberg equilibrium (rigid labor market equilibrium) is found by 
considering a two-stage game solved backwards. In the first stage the 
central bank solves its problem (equation (11)). In the second stage unions 
simultaneously solve their problems (equation (13)) in light of the optimal 
wage-contingent monetary policy rule (equation (11)). Therefore, the Zs  
associated with the Stackelberg solution are computed by considering 
equations (6), (9), and (11) (see Table 1).   9
By substituting the Zs  into equation (13), after some algebra we find the 
following first order condition for union i:
10 
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−− −− − = ⇒ =+  
with:  () 1 ˆ 1
i u Z κη α σ η θ σ φ =− − +=   ,  () ()() 2 11 1 κασ η θ σ φ =−−− −   .  
Each union reacts to an increase in the average wage of other unions by 







Reactions are however less than proportional, since  12 κκ > . By contrast, if 
() 1 αη θ φ −< , union i reacts by decreasing its nominal wage. Thus the 
more conservative the central bank is (the larger is φ ), the more likely it is 
that monetary policy disciplines the unions’ wage policies. 
Equation (14) represents a system of n equations. By imposing the 

















, which can be written as:  
(15)  () ()




αφα φ σαηα η
γ
η σα φ αφ ασ φφ
−− + + −   =
− − ++++  
 
Unemployment and inflation rates are directly derived from equation (15) 
and the aggregate reduced form equations of the model are (remark that 
mw φ =− ):  
                                                 
10 We indicate the Zs associated with the rigid wage regime with an hat.   10





αφα φ σαηα η
γ
η α φ αφ σα σ φ
−− + + −   =
−− + + +  
 
(17)  () () ()
() ( ) {} ()
1
11 1
α φ αφ σαηα ηαφ αφ
π γ
η σ α φ αφ ασ φ φ
−− + + − − +   =
−− ++ + +  
  
Equation (16) is a function of the effective degree of central bank 
conservativeness. Hence monetary policy is non-neutral. After some tedious 
comparative statics algebra, both u and π  can be shown to be decreasing in 
the effective degree of conservativeness.
11 Therefore, Coricelli’s et al. 
(2000) result holds: the more conservative is the central banker, the lower 
are inflation and unemployment.  
By rewriting equation (16) as  ˆˆ
ii wp u uZ Z γ − = , notice that  12 1 κκ φ −= + , the 
channel used by monetary policy to affect real variables in the presence of a 
wage wedge
12  becomes clear. Monetary policy influences union wage 
choices by affecting the utility trade off between the real wage and 
unemployment, since both  ˆ
i wp Z −  and  ˆ
i u Z are function of the effective degree 
of central bank’s conservativeness, φ . This channel is different from the 
standard mechanism based on unions’ inflation aversion—first introduced 
by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994). Now, unions moderate their wage claims 
not because inflation has direct utility costs, but rather out of the fear that 
the central bank’s reaction to inflation will make the real wage-employment 
trade-off implied by their objective functions less favorable.   
                                                 
11 Parameter φ is the only parameter that depends on central bank’s preferences (β). 
12 In this paper a wage wedge between the wage relevant for the firms’ labor demand and 
that relevant for the unions arises: each firm ij, in fact, deflates the nominal wage wi by its 
own-product price and each union i deflates the nominal wage by the average product price.   11
4.3 Flexible labor markets 
In the Nash case each union maximizes its preference under the aggregate 
price constraint (6) and the firm ij’s labor demand (9) by taking the money 
supply and other unions’ nominal wages as given. Union i’s first order 
condition is still equation (13), but now the elasticities faced by the union do 
not depend on monetary policy, and therefore, the Zs  must be recomputed 
using constraints (6) and (9) only. By doing so, and substituting the 
resulting  Zs  into equation (13), more tedious algebra yields union i’s 
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+−  −− 
   { } 1,2,... in ∈  
Union i’s always reacts to money expansion by raising its wage claims since 
the coefficient of m  in equation (18) is always positive. Moreover, unlike 
the case in the rigid wage regime, union i always reacts to increases in the 
average wage of other unions by raising its nominal wage. By taking 
account of the parameter magnitudes it is easy to check that each union 
always reacts less than proportionally to the central bank, with the exception 
of the single union case. If there is only one union, wage policy completely 
neutralizes monetary policy since the reaction coefficient on m is equal to 
one. 
The Nash equilibrium is found by solving the system of  1 n+  equations 
formed by equations (11) and (18). By imposing the symmetry condition   12
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ηα σ η β α
  −− + −
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ασ γ
ηα σ η β α
   −− − −
=−       −− −   
 
After substitution into (6) and (7), the optimal settings for w and m in (19) 
and (20), respectively, imply the following equilibrium macroeconomic 
outcomes:  





ασ η α η
γ
ηα σ η
−− −   =
−−
 




ασ η α η α φ αφ
π γ
ηα σ η φ
−− − − +   =
−− +  
. 
Since the degree of conservativeness is the only parameter dependent on the 
central bank’s preferences, it is clear that monetary authority cannot affect 
the real variable as, i.e., the unemployment rate (u). Thus monetary policy is 
neutral in the flexible wage regime. Moreover, inflation is decreasing in the 
effective degree of conservativeness φ, which, it should be recalled, is an 
increasing function ofβ . Hence Rogoff’s standard results apply. First, 
unemployment is not affected by central bank policy. Second, the more 
conservative the central bank is, the lower inflation is. 
Again equation (21) reflects the unions’ utility trade off between the real 
wage and unemployment. However, now monetary policy is neutral since   13
neither 
i wp Z −  or 
i u Z depend on the effective degree of central bank’s 
conservativeness, φ .  
 
5. Some propositions concerning necessary and sufficient conditions for 
non-neutrality in the light of model outcomes 
The different outcomes associated with the different regimes depend on the 
monetary policy non-neutrality proposition. Therefore, it is important to 
discuss the reasons and conditions for monetary non neutrality. 
In a recent paper Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2002) have shown that a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for non-neutrality is that the unions 
directly or indirectly take account of inflation, in addition to the real wage 
and/or employment. Sufficient conditions for non-neutrality are either (i) 
that unions can pre-commit their wage policies or (ii) that the marginal rate 
of substitution between employment (unemployment) and inflation in the 
unions’ preference is a function of inflation. 
In order to evaluate Acocella and Di Bartolomeo’s non-neutrality 
proposition in our context, two facts have to be noted.
13  
1. For  1 σ <  each union indirectly takes account of inflation because a 
“wage wedge” between the firm and the union exists:
14 Unions deflate 
nominal wages by the general price level whereas the firm’s wage deflator 
is own product price. 
                                                 
13 See Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2002) for a more detailed discussion on the two 
arguments.  
14 This is not the case for σ=1.   14
2. The marginal rate of substitution between unemployment and inflation 
(which recall is here the price level) does not depend on the latter, since 
union i’s preference function is linear in the real wage. 
In our model the necessary condition for non-neutrality is satisfied, whereas 
one of the sufficient conditions is not. Therefore, non-neutrality requires 
satisfaction of the wage pre-commitment condition, which holds in the rigid 
labor market (Stackelberg) regime. 
The comparisons between equations (21) and (16) are consistent with 
Acocella and Di Bartolomeo’s claims: If unions take (indirectly) account of 
inflation, a wage commitment implies non-neutrality. By contrast, since the 
marginal rate of substitution between unemployment and inflation/prices in 
the union’s preference function does not depend on the latter, the Nash 
equilibrium yields monetary neutrality.  
Now assume that only one union exists (i.e.  1 σ = ). In this case there is no 
wage wedge, since the real wage relevant for the union is equal to that 
relevant for the firm ij. Therefore, unions do not weight inflation. In fact, the 
union’s preference can be rewritten in terms of real variables only (i.e. in 
terms of unemployment). The unemployment rate associated with the rigid 
labor market regime (cf. equation (16)) is  
(23)  () 1 u α γ =− . 
Equation (23) is the traditional result of the policy game literature (see, 
among the others, Acocella and Ciccarone, 1997). Hence monetary 
neutrality also characterizes the Stackelberg regime when unions give no 
weight to inflation, directly or indirectly (e.g. through the existence of a   15
wage wedge). Again this result conforms to the necessary condition 
underlined by Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2002). 
Assuming that firms act in a perfectly competitive market also implies that 
the wage wedge does not exist, even if several unions interact in the labor 
market.
15 A competitive goods market is obtained by positing an infinite 
elasticity of product demand with respect to firm ij’s relative price. By 
taking this limit, equation (16) becomes equation (23). Therefore, non-
neutrality again vanishes and Acocella and Di Bartolomeo’s (2002) claims 
are confirmed. 
Finally it should be noticed that if inflation appears directly (in a quadratic 
form) in the union’s objective function, instead of indirectly as in our 
model, the marginal rate of substitution between (real wage) unemployment 
and prices depends on inflation levels. Therefore, non-neutrality always 
holds




In this paper we considered a standard model of imperfectly competitive 
markets for goods and labor where a central bank and several unions 
strategically interact. Unions had the capacity to set wages and firms had the 
capacity to set prices, subject to downward sloping labor and product 
demand functions. We extended the standard setup by investigating the 
macroeconomic consequences of two different labor market regimes. 
                                                 
15 Because the price that all unions face is the same and it is given. 
16 See Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Coricelli et al. (2000).   16
A rigid wage regime was defined by the presence of binding wage contracts 
such that nominal wages could not be adjusted ex-post, that is, after 
realizations of monetary policy. A flexible wage regime was defined by an 
institutional framework in which unions and the central bank simultaneously 
determine wages and the money supply, respectively, according to the 
expected behavior of the rival’s policy.  
We found that if only one union is present in the labor market, standard 
Rogoff results hold no matter which regime is in place. By contrast, if there 
is a multiplicity  of unions, the rigid wage regime is associated with 
monetary non-neutrality, whereas the flexible wage regime is associated 
with monetary neutrality.  
These results confirm conclusions of recent studies attempting to identify 
the channels of monetary policy non-neutrality. In particular, results are in 
line with two propositions specifically derived for the single-union policy 
games. First, if a union is not inflation-averse, money non-neutrality can 
arise only when the union indirectly weights inflation. In our case unions 
weight inflation because of the existence of a wage wedge, which arises 
between the real wage relevant for workers (normed to the general price 
level) and that relevant for the firm (normed to product price).  
Second, concern about inflation is not a sufficient condition. It is predicted 
that non-neutrality is ensured if either the marginal rate of substitution 
between unemployment and prices in the union’s preference function 
depends on prices, or unions can pre-commit their nominal wages. In our 
case, the marginal rate of substitution between unemployment and prices in   17
the union’s preference function does not depend on prices. Non-neutrality 
can arise only if unions pre-commit (rigid wage regime). 
 
 
Appendix – The baseline monopolistic competition model 
This appendix describes the economic setup where players act, it mainly 
correspond to the first stage of the Coricelli’s et al. (2000) game. In the 
goods market monopolistic competition is assumed. A continuum of 
identical firms is evenly distributed over the unit interval and their total 
mass is one. Firms face the same demand and technological constraints.  













where  ij P  and P  are individual firm price and the general price level. The 
general price level is defined as the geometric average of the prices of 
individual firms.  1 η >  is the elasticity of demand facing the individual firm 






is the real quantity of money. 











P pp d j p d j
−
=
≡= = ∑∫∫  with  () ln ij ij p P ≡ . 
Each firm owns a production technology using only labor input and 
exhibiting decreasing returns to scale:   18
(A.2)  ij ij YL
α =    () 0,1 α ∈  
where  ij Y  and  ij L  are the output supply and the labor input of firm ij. The 
production function implies that the labor requirement for any level of 
output is  
1/
ij ij L Y
α
= . 







Π= − . 
The usual profit maximization condition that marginal revenue equals 
















By substituting equation (A.1) into equation (A.4), we obtain the optimal 
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 is the mark-up.  
Equation (A.5) states that the optimal relative price of firm ij’s is higher the 
higher is the real wage it faces and the higher are real money balances.  












, and using equation 
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and taking the logs of expression (A.6), we derive firm ij’s demand for 
labor:  
(A.7) 





ij i lm p w p η ηαηµ
αη α
=− − − + −   +−
 
By taking the logs, equation (A.5) becomes: 
(A.8)
 
() () ( )( ) ( ) ( ) {}
1
1l n l n
1
ij i pp m p w p αα µ α
αη α
−= − − + − + −     +−
 
Averaging equation (A.8) over the firms and rearranging we obtain the 
reduced form for the equilibrium general price level:  
(A.9)  () 0 1 p wm p αα =+ − +  
where  () () 0 ln ln p α µ α =−      
We find log aggregate employment by taking the average of (A.7) and 
substituting in for log aggregate price given by (A.9): 








From equation (A.10) the reduced form for unemployment rate can also be 
derived. 
(A.11)  () 0 ulll mwl =− =− − −   20
where  l  is the logarithm of aggregate labor supply, which also coincides 
with the per firm labor supply since the total mass of firms is equal to one. 
In order to obtain a model simpler to handle, we abstract from the location 
parameters in equations (A.9), (A.10), and (A.11) by neglecting  0 p ,  0 l , and 
l .  The unemployment rate is therefore proportional to  l − .  
Notice that the omission of l ,  0 l , and  0 p  is without loss of generality since 
these parameters do not affect solutions to the games because of the linear-
quadratic functional forms of objective functions. A rigorous proof is 
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